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THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
CONFERENCE:
CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE LITIGATION PROCESS:
Do THE MERITS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH MATTER ANYMORE?

DAY ONE
PANEL ONE:
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
MAX BOOT, MODERATOR*

I will keep my opening remarks mercifully brief, and then, ideally, we
will get to the panelists and a good discussion quickly.
Our topic today, as I am sure many of you are aware, is "Class
Actions, Useful Litigation Device or Tool of the Devil?" We have both
sides represented in this debate, a debate that is convulsing the American
legal system, and has been for a number of years. If we can just convince
our panelists to overcome their natural inclination to be polite and
respectful toward each other's viewpoints, we will have a wonderful,
engaging discussion.
I am sure this audience needs little introduction to the history of class
actions. Their modem history dates from the 1966 revision of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' It has been said that the authors
of that revision had little idea of what they were unleashing on the world.
The lawyers who rewrote Rule 23 did so to make it easier for
Southern blacks to win injunctive relief against Jim Crow segregation.
What they also created was a seemingly endless line of cases that have
enriched many lawyers, clogged many courtrooms, and occasionally- even
delivered a few dollars for plaintiffs.
* Editorial writer and deputy features editor at the editorial page of The Wall Street
Journal.
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), for example,
provides that "[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions o7 law or fact common to the class, (3) the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class." Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The use of class actions has been tremendously controversial. Two
main categories of criticism are made. First, it is argued that class actions
are inherently incapable of dealing with mass torts. Indeed, the drafters
of Rule 23 in that famous note alluded to this point.' Not only are class
members' interests too divergent to be tried in one setting, but certifying
a class often puts a gun to defendants' heads and forces them to settle
cases that are largely meritless.
For these reasons, various appeals courts, including the Fifth Circuit,
which is represented today on the panel, have been decertif),ing tort class
actions, most recently in Castano v. American Tobacco Co. Many of the
appeals courts' fears about what class actions can do in a mass tort context
were confirmed in the breast implant case, where Dow Corning went
bankrupt despite joining a global settlement and despite the fact that to this
day there is not a shred of credible scientific evidence that the company
did anything wrong. 4 I am sure some members of our panel will disagree
with this viewpoint.
The second common criticism of class actions is that they are driven
primarily by the needs of lawyers rather than plaintiffs. Indeed, in many
cases, namely the airline price-fixing settlement5 or the America Online
settlement,' many class members are not even aware of what is happening
procedurally, because of the opt-out device that courts usually interpret as
meaning that a class action can always be certified as long as class
members have the choice to opt-out.' And, of course, I am sure all of
2. See id. 1966 amendment to advisory committee's note (stating that a mass tort
is ordinarily an inappropriate class action because liability and damages affect individuals
differently).
3. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
4. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996) (indicating that
in May 1995, Dow Coming filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code due to the burdens imposed by the massive tort litigation); see also In re Dow
Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 919-23 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
5. See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga.
1993) (approving the settlement of a class action which included $50 million in cash and
discount travel certificates valued at $408 million).
6. See Hagen v. America Online, Inc., No. 971047 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 20,
1996) (order approving modified class action settlement in which America Online will
pay up to $500,000 and provide free online time to users).
7. See Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose
Interest?, 63 B.U. L. REv. 597, 618 (1983) (stating that the 1966 amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) redefined a class member by an opt-out rather than an
opt-in system; because the vast majority of potential class members was unresponsive,
the 1966 amendment served to magnify class actions and, consequently, raised attorneys'
fees).
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the lawyers in this room carefully read those fine-print notices they get in
the mail and those ads in the back of newspapers; but I know that I do
not, and most average people do not. Thus, we have no idea what is
actually happening when class actions are certified, and we certainly do
not choose to exercise to opt-out, because the stakes for the individual are
so tiny it is just not worth it.
Nevertheless, the lawyers can go ahead and certify the class and reap
millions in fees from representing these unwilling plaintiffs. The most
extreme example is where, after settlement of a class action, Bank of
Boston deposited less than nine dollars in each class member's account,
but paid over eight million dollars in lawyers fees; the bank then withdrew
upwards of ninety dollars from many accounts.8 Thus, the class action
wound up costing the plaintiffs money.
Incidentally, before turning to the panelists, I should note that class
actions do not always pit plaintiffs versus defendants, or plaintiffs' lawyers
versus defendants' lawyers. Many defendants embrace class actions as a
way to limit their liability. We saw this with the Georgine v. Amchen
Products settlement where the asbestos manufacturers struck a deal with
Ron Motley and Gene Locks because they wanted to settle one hundred
thousand future claims.9 Conversely, many defense lawyers, including
many "Naderite" people, say they often oppose these class action
settlements because they short-change the rights of individual plaintiffs in
favor of their class counsel.
That is all I will say about the background of class actions, because
I think you are much more eager to hear from the panelists.
Our first panelist, Judge Higginbotham, is a distinguished member of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and also occupies a significant place in
class action history. Among other opinions, he authored the 1990
Fibreboarddecision, which decertified an asbestos class and eventually
paved the way for the decertification of the Castano class by the Fifth
Circuit."0 He now presides over the Judicial Conference's committee
8. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996)

(describing the predicament of one such class member whose account had been credited
$2.19 and debited $91.33 as a result of the Hoffman-Bank of Boston Mortgage

Corporation settlement).
9. See Georgine v. Amchen Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
grantedsub nom. Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996) (stating that
the class action most notably seeks to settle future claims where certain exposed
individuals currently exhibit no physical ailments, which would extinguish future
asbestos-related causes of action by exposed individuals).

10. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a multi-state class

because the district court had ignored both state law variations and the difficulties in
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that is rewriting Rule 23, an effort that may not get much ink in the
popular press, but is very controversial in the legal world. He has also
witnessed the formation of the so-called Steering Committee to Oppose
Proposed Rule 23, which is made up of various law school luminaries."
Before we started, I told the judge that if he is opposed by everybody in
the law schools, then he must be doing something right.
The next speaker, Sheila Birnbaum, is not only one of the leading
defense lawyers in mass tort litigation but also one of the nicest people on
either side of these bitter fights. As head of the Products Liability
Department at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, she and her staff
have represented Dow Corning in the breast implant litigation,' 2
American Stores in litigation over salmonella contamination of milk, 3
and Georgia Pacific in cases involving defective building materials. 4
Incidentally, I might add, although she is a defense lawyer, she is hardly
cut from the typical Federalist Society cloth, in that she assures me that
she is a genuine, longstanding Democrat.
Our third panelist will likely present precisely the opposite view from
Ms. Birnbaum. James Finberg is a representative from Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann and Bernstein in San Francisco, which is one of the leading class
action firms in the country. It has been involved in everything from the
breast implant global settlement to the GM pickup general settlement that
was rejected last year by the Third Circuit. Further, they have been
prominently involved in the Castano case. If it is a class action, I think
you will find Lieff, Cabraser somewhere on the plaintiff steering
committee.
overcoming them).
11. See Henry J. Reske, Making Class Distinctions: Critics Say Class Action
Proposals Encourage Collusion as Well as Settlements, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 22
(noting that 145 professors have criticized the Rule 23 proposals in a letter to the Judicial

Conference of the United States Standing Committee).
12. See Vitolo v. Dow Coming Corp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1995)
(holding that a physician who sued Dow Coming for fraud and sought recovery for
damages to his professional reputation successfully pled his fraud claim, and had standing
to sue under New York's deceptive acts and practices statutes, but that he could not

recover for emotional harm).
13. In re Salmonella Litig., 618 N.E.2d 487, 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that
an employee who allegedly contracted salmonellosis from drinking his employer's milk
was not constrained by the double recovery rule, which prevents accident victims from
double recovery for their injuries, because the rule does not apply to such settlements).
14. See Pulte Home Corp. v. Ply Gem Indus., 804 F. Supp. 1471, 1475 (M.D. Fla.

1992) (holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment on a builder's claim for

punitive damages and fraud, and that the builder had standing to sue defendants for

damages).
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The next speaker, Janet Alexander, clerked for Justice Thurgood
Marshall and is currently a Professor at Stanford Law School. Although
she teaches at Stanford, she received her law degree from my alma mater,
Berkeley. She has been writing a significant amount on the impact of
attorney fees in class actions, and that is the topic she is going to speak
about today.
And, finally, our most famous panelist. Michael Moore's official title
is Attorney General of the State of Mississippi. However, I think he is
better known among the tobacco companies as "Public Enemy Number
One," the man who started the current trend of states hiring contingency
fee lawyers to sue tobacco companies to recoup their Medicaid costs.
Although not technically class actions, the state Medicaid suits are broadly
similar to the class actions that are filed now at the state level in the wake
of Castano. Those actions purport to represent all of the people injured
by the tobacco companies over the years, and I am sure Attorney General
Mike Moore will defend the efficacy of this type of litigation.

CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
THE HONORABLE PATRICK HIGGINBOTHAM, FIRST PANELIST'

I thought I would quickly identify what is pertinent from the
perspective of rulemaking, without getting into a lot of the boring details
about their structure, to describe the rules process.
First, a couple of general observations about the work of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules. There is a consensus, or a view, that when
looking at class actions it is important to realize the limits of rules. Rule
changes cannot solve the large problems before us.
Much of what we are seeing is not the product of rules, but the
product of a complex interaction of events. I start with the Supreme
Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.' When lawyers are
allowed to advertise like shoe merchants, they may act as merchants. The
open solicitation of cases is part of the mix in which this phenomenon that
we are now seeing arises.
Add to that mix a tort law that is open-ended and suffering mightily
from indeterminacy. For example, it is very difficult to understand
exactly what the normative limits and push of the product liability rules
are. The judge asks the jury, "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the first
question you must decide in this case is whether or not the product was
defective. I instruct you that the product is defective if its risk of injury
to the public outweighs its utility of design. Now, if your answer to that
question is 'yes,' then answer the next question. Was that defect a
producing cause of injury and, if you answer yes, then how much in
dollars would reasonably compensate the plaintiff?" Other instructions
given would include matters of credibility. This simply demonstrates what
inevitably is a difficulty: the underlying indeterminacy of the substantive
law itself. Add to this mix the talk shows and the role of the media, and
we begin to see the complex forces at play.
I think it is short-sighted to view mass tort class actions as the
creatures of lawyers. Lawyers play a heavy role in these actions, but
many of those lawyers are on the bench.
That said, the approach of the advisory committee has been to reach
out to meet with plaintiffs' lawyers, and with defense lawyers, to listen to
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Judge Higginbotham

also serves as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University Law
School.
1. 433 U.S. 350, 363-83 (1977) (holding that commercial speech which serves
individual and societal interests in assuring information and reliable decision-making is
entitled to some first amendment protection, and hence truthful legal advertising by
attorneys may not be suppressed).
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the debate and try to learn as much as we can. As a result of these
meetings, we came forward with eight proposals, what we term the
"minimalist proposal." What the advisory committee did not recommend
may be the larger story. For example, we declined to address future
classes and left those to the development of the law itself.
The central proposal rests on the proposition that we need more
appellate involvement in the development of the law. Therefore, the
proposed rules will provide a right of appeal for the party that loses the
class certification decision. The "right" of appeal is a petition for leave
to appeal, and the court of appeals may decide not to grant it. But under
the proposal, parties will have a right to take that decision to the court of
appeals. This will relieve some of the stress that is placed on mandamus,
which is important because the courts are now reviewing some of these
claims. We think this is important.
Today, the law of class actions consists of a set of legal cultures that
revolve and oscillate around distinct substantive areas of the law. The law
of class actions in the antitrust field is different from the law of class
actions in the securities field, and the law of class actions with regard to
discrimination cases is also different in the same way. We cannot back
away from this interplay of substance and procedure.
In the securities field, substantive law will determine the ultimate
ability of these cases to be processed, or aggregated. For example, fraud
on the market theories and the elimination of reliance cases, without faceto-face negotiation, are vehicles by which these cases are aggregated. In
the antitrust field, case law provides the substantive rules and the
facilitators of aggregation, more so in the real world than the bare-bone
outlines of Rule 23.
I am not going to go through each of the other proposals. However,
one of the other powerful suggestions that we are going forward with is
to move away from the traditional approach of Rule 23, which is quick,
early certification. The rules now urge district judges to certify early and
quickly. Frequently, that is done with soothing words to: "certify now,
decertify and redefine later, and it will all work out."2 Until recently,
2. See Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 92 n.15 (3d Cir. 1979) (discussing
the practice of courts construing the requirements of Rule 23 liberally, particularly when
the determination of the propriety of the class action is being made at an early stage of

the proceedings, and to modify the order as necessary to comport with subsequently
developed facts); Shannon v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 96 F.R.D. 236,239 (D.V.I.
1982) (stating that, by its own terms, Rule 23(c) provides for a flexible determination as
to the existence, scope, and size of a proposed class); see also 7B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that
the power to change the class certification decision under Rule 23 has encouraged many

courts to be quite liberal in certifying a class at an early stage in the litigation, because
the action can be decertified if later events suggest it is appropriate).
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that has been the emphasis. The shift is to wait, which involves allowing
some cases to mature and to not move so quickly to class certifications.
One of the other central recommendations addresses the problem that
Max Boot referred to: the difficulty of screening out cases in which the
returns to the class are de minimis from those cases in which class action
is necessary to deal with large numbers of people who have been injured
by some common phenomenon.
A particularly egregious example of the former is the coupon cases,
where attorneys make millions and the return to individual class members
is negligible. 3 By the time a class member sends in a claim form, it may
cost him money. Not exactly a win, by any definition, for that member
of the class.
Where the class members themselves simply do not benefit from the
action, the class has become nothing but a vehicle to pay lawyers. The
sense was that the district judge should be armed with the ability to screen
those cases out. However, the judges do not want, in that process, to
eliminate-and I do not think the committee is authorized to do so-the
consumer class actions. Congress should decide the particular remedy for
the particular statutory wrong.
Correspondingly, we ought not to create an enforcement mechanism
that Congress did not create. We do not think the district judges or other
courts ought to have the power to say that it is in the public interest that
a particular class action proceed to vindicate particular public values. The
definition of public value should belong to Congress. That has come to
be known as the "Just Ain't Worth It Provision" and it has been the
subject of a great deal of discussion.
Finally, settlement classes will receive significant attention. The
proposals for change in that area are quite modest, as I mentioned earlier.
We do not deal with the larger and more difficult problem of futures,
which I think is the most difficult issue in this whole area of class actions.
At this point, I will subside.

3. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at D1
(criticizing settlements where plaintiffs' attorneys get large cash fees and plaintiffs get
nontransferable coupons toward future purchases from defendant).

CLASS CERTIFICATION-THE EXCEPTION, NOT THE RULE
SHEILA BIRNBAUM, SECOND PANELIST*

I think before we even focus on class actions, we need to look at the
modern technology that has created mass tort litigation. When I first
started practicing law, carbon paper still was used, and if a mistake was
made on a complaint or a pleading, it had to be changed manually on
multiple copies. One cannot imagine having a breast implant litigation if
still forced to use carbon paper. Word processors, fax machines and
computers have given us a new world and the Bar has embraced that
world.
The problems with class actions are numerous. One development in
the last two years is that appellate federal courts have recognized that
lower courts have gone astray in certifying mass tort class actions. Thus,
the Third Circuit,' the Fifth Circuit,2 the Sixth Circuit, 3 and the Seventh
Circuit" have all scrutinized mass tort class actions and have decided that
national mass tort classes are improper.
In medical device and tobacco litigation, national class actions are not
appropriate. First, there is the conflicts of law issue. It is not possible,
in my opinion, for a court to certify a national class of anything in the tort
area. Basically, the law of the fifty states varies in significant ways, and
the nuances, even in negligence, as Judge Posner pointed out, make it
impossible to have a class action if tort law is indeed state-made law,
which it is. As some courts have explained-and as I have experienced
first-hand-it is simply impossible to synthesize the products liability law
of the fifty states into a meaningful jury instruction for a class action trial
without trampling on the sovereignty of those states, which have made
some fundamentally different policy choices in their products liability
rules. In fact, Congress had an opportunity to pass a federal products
liability bill and declined to do it. 5 The passage of a federal products
liability law might have created some interesting issues as to whether such
* Partner and head of the Product Liability Department, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP. I would like to thank my associate, J. Russell Jackson, who
assisted in the preparation of this address.

1. See Georgine v. Amchen Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
grantedsub nom. Amchen Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996); see also In
re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
2. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
3. See In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
4. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
5. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 103 (1995).
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a uniform act would overcome some of the issues that Judge Becker and
Judge Posner raised concerning conflicts of law.
With conflicts of law the way they are, and with state law dominating
the tort area, unless there is a single factual issue, there is no possibility
that a court can certify a national class action in mass torts. Some of our
appellate courts have come to grips with, and understand, this reality.
But the plaintiffs' bar is very creative. Thus, some cases I currently
am litigating started out as putative nationwide class actions, but the
lawyers are now seeking certification of only a statewide class. "Judge,
just give me a class action of all of the residents of the State of Florida,
or the State of Pennsylvania." As you all know, after the Castano case
was decertified, plaintiffs' lawyers immediately initiated a number of state
class actions that were filed in state, not federal, courts. 6
Hence, class actions for mass torts are still extant, notwithstanding the
kinds of decisions we have seen. But with the apparent trend of filing
these suits in state courts, we will have less ability to predict the
disposition of these cases.
In states like Alabama, it is not
inconceivable-in fact it has happened on many occasions-that the class
is certified before defendants are even served with the complaint, or prior
to a contested hearing. 7 This is an outrageous denial of due process,
particularly when one considers the enormous consequences to defendants
of class certification, both in the litigation and in the financial markets.
Most often the problem in such situations is not the state's written class
action rule, as most states follow the federal rule. Rather, the problem is
that state court trial judges are given too much discretion in applying the
rule. I think that the Bar and the bench are going to have to explore how
to resolve these issues, particularly in light of the change in focus in mass
torts from federal class actions to state class actions.
Another problem with class actions lies in the financial incentives that
give rise to a race to the courthouse. The position of "lead class counsel"
typically goes to the law firm that gets a class action filed first or, in the
case of multi-district litigation (MDL), wins the fight over where the MDL
will be venued. Lead class counsel often has more control over the
conduct and settlement of litigation-and may be entitled to more
fees-than other plaintiffs' lawyers involved in the litigation. As a result,
the major plaintiffs' firms do their best to be the first to file a class action
lawsuit over a particular product or mass tort. This creates an incentive
6. See More Post-'Castano' Cases, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at A8 (reporting

that eight states have filed class action suits since the decertification of Castano).
7. See, e.g., ExparteSizemore, 611 So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Ala. 1993) (Houston, J.,

dissenting) (discussing Melof v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. Ala. 1989), a class
action where the class was certified prior to defendants being given notice or the
opportunity to file defensive pleadings).
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for counsel to neglect the factual investigation required to determine
whether the case truly does present a classwide problem, as opposed to an
individual problem. One clue that a purely individual problem may exist
is where numerous class actions are filed where there previously has been
little or no individual litigation over a particular product or course of
conduct.
Let me provide an example of what I think prompts class litigation
where there is no, or at least very little, actual litigation. This particular
example mimics a case that was decided by the Ninth Circuit involving a
product called Felbatol. s A drug is used. Some adverse reactions arise,
and a study is conducted. The manufacturer alerts the FDA to the study
results and proposes sending a "Dear Doctor" letter to apprise the medical
profession of the newly-discovered risk. Within days, multiple putative
nationwide class actions are filed by multiple law firms in courts across
the country on behalf of all the users of this particular product. That is
precisely what happened in the Valentino case. 9 An MDL was created,
and the MDL judge certified a class of all users of the drug, regardless of
whether they were injured. Not all users were injured, nor were all users
afflicted with aplastic anemia, the alleged illness this drug causes.
In this particular case, the class was certified before there was one
individual claim in the entire country filed against the company. This is
an excellent example of what becomes mega-litigation before there really
is any litigation.
So what is a court supposed to do with a class action that has been
filed prematurely? As you might expect, I believe it should be promptly
dismissed. But some courts-particularly where the science of causation
is inconclusive, but extensive study is underway-may postpone the class
certification decision until later in the litigation.
One part of the problem I would like to address, which was recently
raised by Judge Schell in Norplant, 0 is this: If courts are going to make
decisions about class actions later in the process, we cannot lose track of
the fact that, under the principle announced in the Supreme Court's
decision in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah," many states
hold that their statutes of limitations are tolled during the time period
8. See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (vacating and
remanding a lower court decision certifying a class in a products liability activity against

manufacturers of an epilepsy drug).

9. See id. at 1229 (noting that in August and September 1994, Carter-Wallace sent
letters to the physician community warning of the risks of aplastic anemia and liver
failure associated with the use of Felbatol).

10. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 907 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Tex.
1995).

11. 414 U.S. 538, 561 (1973).
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between when the class action is filed and when the certification decision
is made.
The tolling caused by an improperly certified class action can span a
number of years. For example, in one instance involving a medical
device, it took nearly four years for an improper class certification to be
overturned on appeal.' 2 Thus, as a result of the improper application of
a federal procedural rule, the substantive policies of the states-embodied
in their statutes of limitations-were thwarted, and the window in which
the defendant could be subjected to individual suits was significantly
enlarged.
What do these types of class actions cause? They lead to "legalized
blackmail."13 My friends in the plaintiffs' bar say that defendants settle
class actions that have merit and do not settle meritless class actions.
This argument, although attractive in its simplicity, is wrong. The
certification of a class action fundamentally alters the litigation calculus
for the party opposing certification, placing enormous pressure on that
party to settle prior to trial, even where the class proponents' likely
individual recoveries (or their likelihood of success on the merits) are low.
To the defendant, one thousand individual cases are not equivalent to a
class action involving one thousand members. Faced with a large number
of individual cases, the defendant may seek to quantify its litigation risk
by evaluating the cases individually, taking note of their strengths,
weaknesses, and venues; thereby predicting a win-loss ratio and an
average jury award. Once a trial class is certified, however, the defendant
must evaluate its litigation risk in the aggregate, taking into account the
fact that it may face at trial only the strongest representative class
members selected by class counsel. On the basis of one trial, the
defendant may be found liable to all named and identified class members
and, in many instances, to thousands of class members who have yet to be
identified. Given the uncertainties of litigation, few defendants can
withstand the pressure to settle after the class is certified rather than risk
an adverse jury verdict in a single class action trial.
Moreover, one cannot forget the environment we live in. The
uncertainty embodied in the kind of massive contingent liability a class
action represents hangs over a corporate defendant's head, affecting its
stock price, borrowing power, and, ultimately, all aspects of its business.
12. See In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (vacating an
order of class certification and holding that plaintiffs in a penile implant class failed to
satisfy the requirements for class certification).
13. The term "legalized blackmail" appeared in Milton Handler's antitrust review
and described class actions that are used to threaten parties with unmanageable and

expensive litigation in order to compel settlement. See Milton Handler, The Shiftfron
Substantive to ProceduralInnovationsin Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9(1971).
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If the class is certified, the markets read this as increasing the likelihood
that the contingent liability will materialize. Markets value certainty, and
the pressure to bring an end to even meritless class actions can be almost
irresistible to corporate defendants, particularly when one figures in the
enormous litigation costs inherent in the protracted process of defending
a class action. Thus, the class action-a "procedural" device intended to
achieve certain efficiencies of scale through aggregation-is a mighty
sword that can affect the substantive outcome of the litigation without
regard to the "merits" of the claims.
There are no free rides. When companies pay out large sums of
money to settle class action lawsuits-even meritless class
actions-someone pays the price. Often it is in higher product prices. Or
it may be through the complete unavailability of certain products, whether
by bankrupting the defendant, or by having a viable company decide to
discontinue (or simply not develop) a product. For example, raw
materials suppliers have been added as defendants in breast implant
litigation, in addition to the manufacturers of the implants. As a result,
raw materials used in making medical devices, sometimes called
"biomaterials," are becoming unavailable to device manufacturers because
the suppliers have determined that it costs more to defend themselves in
lawsuits involving finished medical devices than the small profit they may
make in selling these versatile materials to medical device
manufacturers. 14
In the end, we must recognize that the class action device is more than
just a procedural tool for aggregation. It is instead a very unique
instrument-one with as much, if not more, potential for wreaking havoc
and perverting the "incentives" normally associated with tort law. This
characteristic suggests that class certification should be the exception, not
the rule, and that where a class is certified, it must be subjected to
constant judicial scrutiny.

14. See, e.g., BiomaterialsAvailability:A Vital Health CareIndustry Hangs in the

Balance(AronoffAssoc., 1997) <http://www.himanet.com/news/mediakits/biomaterials
/bioavail-index.htm>; Barnaby J.Feder, Implant Industry Is Facing Cutback by Top

Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at Al.

CLASS ACTIONS: USEFUL DEVICES THAT PROMOTE
JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND PROVIDE ACCESS TO JUSTICE
JAMES M. FINBERG, THIRD PANELIST*

Some class actions do go to trial. My partner, Elizabeth Cabraser, is
currently on trial in Alabama State Court in a class action involving
defective hard board siding. The closing arguments are today. We will
find out what the merits are according to an American jury.1
Plaintiffs' lawyers are really like Bob Dole. We say, do not trust the
government; trust the American people. Let the jury system tell you
whether there are meritorious claims.
When class actions go to juries, the American people speak. They
conclude that many class action claims are meritorious. In the Apple
securities litigation, the jury reached a one hundred million dollar
verdict. 2 In the ACC/Lincoln Savings and Loan securities litigation, the
jury reached a multi-billion dollar verdict.3 In the Exxon Valdez case, the
jury reached a verdict in excess of five billion dollars. 4 The American
people tell us what justice is.
Class actions serve very important and useful functions. The first
function is judicial economy. When thousands of people have the same
claim, it does not make sense to have the same evidence going in over and
over again or to have the same people deposed over and over again. Nor
does it make sense for the same witnesses to appear over and over again
in different courts or to have multiple courts re-analyze the same issues
and perhaps come to inconsistent rulings. Class actions serve judicial
economy.
Even more importantly, they provide access to justice. Our justice
system is not a system only for the rich and powerful. It is also a system
for everyday Americans who need legal redress when they have been
wronged. Class actions give them that opportunity by allowing them to
* Partner, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

1. Shortly after this symposium, the jury found that Masonite's exterior siding was
defectively designed. See Naefv. Masonite Corp., No. CV-94-4033 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Sept.
13, 1996).
2. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., C-84-20148(A)-JW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
1991); see also Ken Siegmann, Apple Verdict Stuns Lawyers; They Fear Flood of
Litigation, S.F. CHRON., June 1, 1991, at Bi.

3. See In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., MDL
No. 834 (D. Ariz. 1992); Elliot Blair Smith, $4.4 Billion Awarded in Lincoln Case; Jury
OrdersKeating and Cohorts to Pay, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 11, 1992, at Al.
4. See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH) (D. Alaska Sept. 16, 1994)
(Special Verdict for Phase Hm of trial).
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aggregate their claims and to fight rich and powerful corporations. By
aggregating their claims, they can hire the experts and lawyers who can
do the analysis that is necessary.
In the discrimination area, class actions have had a tremendous
positive impact. I refer you to two examples of cases that improved the
American workplace by making available to women and African
Americans employment opportunities that they were previously denied.
The Shoney's case5 was a race discrimination class action against a
restaurant chain for excluding African Americans from higher paying,
higher visibility positions. The Wall Street Journalpublished a front page
article this last April. 6 In the article, the company's management
conceded that the suit ended up being a very good thing for the company.
The suit forced the company to hire African Americans for jobs that they
are now performing very ably. The suit made Shoney's a better company.
Shoney's is now thriving, even though it paid approximately $105 million
in this race discrimination class action to compensate the victims of the
company's past discrimination.
Similarly, the State Farm gender discrimination case 7 forced State
Farm in particular, and the insurance industry overall, to give women the
opportunity to be insurance agents. 8 Twenty years ago in California,
there were about eleven hundred State Farm insurance salesmen and there
was only one female agent, who had inherited her husband's business.
That was not because women were not able to sell insurance; it was
because State Farm was not hiring women to sell insurance. In the gender
discrimination class action, State Farm paid approximately $260 million
in back pay and front pay. As a result of the suit, State Farm has changed
its practices. Men and women are now almost equally represented in the
employment work force of State Farm insurance agents in California.
And that case also had an impact on other insurance companies who
looked at what happened to State Farm and said, it is not going to happen
to us. They started hiring women for their agent work force.
Class actions are good for the American economy. They deter racist
conduct and encourage employers to tap the talents and abilities of all
Americans, not just white men.
Now, the Judge mentioned the consumer case where the individual
might not get a huge return and that there is a concern that the case is
only for lawyers. On the other hand, one does not want companies
5. Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., No. 89-30093-RV (N.D. Fla. 1991).
6. See Dorothy J. Gaiter, Eating Crow: How Shoney's, Belted by a Lawsuit, Found
the Path to Diversity, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1996, at Al.
7. Kraszewski v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. C 79-1261 TEH, 1985 WL 1616 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 29, 1985).
8. See id.
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defrauding individuals on the rationale that since the individual only has
a fifty dollar claim and it would cost the individual one thousand dollars
to sue, he or she will not do anything about the fraud. Lack of
meaningful access to the judicial system by consumers would create a
license to lie for companies.
My firm had a case involving light bulbs where the package said that
the bulb is the environmentally sensitive light bulb. 9 A consumer paid
twice as much as he or she paid for the normal one hundred watt light
bulb to get this environmentally sound light bulb. Well, the reason that
this light bulb was environmentally sound was it provided only eighty
watts. So the consumer was getting less light and paying more.
No individual is going to hire a lawyer about that case based on her
individual losses alone. It simply does not make sense. But that does not
mean that the behavior of that company is appropriate and should be
rewarded. The company should not make millions as the result of deceit.
That suit should go forward on a class basis.
Now, what should happen in terms of the attorneys' fees? In both
state and federal court, the attorneys' fees paid to attorneys representing
a class must be awarded by a judge, who must determine that the fees
awarded are reasonable. In California, the courts generally take into
account the hours the attorney worked, the hourly rates of the attorneys
involved, whether a benefit was conferred, and whether there was
contingency risk. If appropriate, the court gives a multiplier on the
attorneys' hours times rates (which is sometimes referred to as the
attorneys' "lodestar"). Federal courts often award a percentage of the
fund created. Courts can and should determine the appropriate amount of
attorneys' fees. The fact that attorneys receive a fee for their work (as do
all other employed Americans) should not be a reason to prevent
meritorious suits from going forward.
In terms of blackmail and the size of settlements, if a suit has no
merit, fight it. Make the motion to dismiss. Make the motion for
summary judgment. Knock it out.
If a company pays $500,000 to settle a case, maybe that is the cost of
defense. But when the accountants and lawyers in Lincoln Savings paid,
collectively, approximately $145 million to settle those cases,"0 that was
not cost of defense. They paid such a large sum because they did
something wrong. They paid because of their misconduct and the harm
caused by that misconduct. Such payments are appropriate because they
deter other companies from engaging in similar behavior.
9. See In re GE Energy Choice Light Bulb Consumer Litig., No. C-92-4447-BAC
(N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 22, 1993).
10. See Jeff Rowe, Lawsuit Results, ORANGE CoUNTY REG., July 11, 1992, at Al;

see also Smith, supra note 3.
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One of the reasons that the American securities markets thrive is that
people feel confident investing in American companies. One of the
reasons they feel confident is because companies are afraid of engaging in
fraud because of private class actions.
Let me turn now to the mass tort area. With respect to the laws of
the fifty states, there are two ways that plaintiffs approach this issue. One
is to say that the laws don't vary much from state to state and a court
could apply the laws of all fifty states. There have been three courts that
have done this. One of them was my firm's case, the Cordis Pacemaker
case" in Ohio, which eventually settled prior to trial. A second was
Judge Brimmer's Albuterol case 2 in Wyoming, which was tried for
several months before settling. The third is the Masonite case, 3 which
is now being tried in Alabama. 4
The Albuterol and Masonite cases show that it is possible to go to trial
with the laws of the fifty states and give the jury special interrogatories
about various issues such as recklessness, negligence, defective design,
and whether the plaintiffs proved their case by clear and convincing
evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence. In this way, one can
apply the various laws.
There is a constitutional issue about applying the laws of the fifty
states. In Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,' 5 the United States Supreme
Court said that if one is going to apply the law of a state to a company,
there has to be a nexus between that state's law and the company. And
I believe, in the future, plaintiffs will bring mass tort lawsuits in the home
state of a major defendant and urge the court to apply the state law of that
defendant. In such circumstances, the defendant can anticipate that it
should have to obey the law of its home state. That will get around the
problem of having conflicts of law that were seen in the Castano tobacco
litigation.
But let me now focus on the Cordis case 6 for a little while. Cordis
was a case where the pacemaker manufacturer knew that its pacemakers
were defective. The pacemakers would stop working. There were two
11. In re Cordis Pacemaker Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 850, C-3-86-543, 1992
WL 754061 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 1992).
12. In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).
13. Naefv. Masonite Corp., No. CV-94-4033 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 1996) (order
certifying class).
14. Recently, after the Symposium, Judge Spiegel of the Southern District of Ohio
certified a mass tort class involving defective pacemaker leads in In re Teletronics Pacing
System, Inc., MDL-1059 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 1997). To address varying state laws, the
court grouped the class into subclasses by state and issue.
15. 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
16. 1992 WL 754061.
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kinds of defective pacemakers: one that had holes in the back that caused
short-circuiting of the pacemaker and another that had a lithium bridging
problem with the battery that caused the battery and the pacemaker to
stop. The company continued to sell these defective pacemakers to over
thirty-three hundred people, knowing them to be defective. The company
and its officers were criminally indicted for this, and pleaded nolo
contendere.
Now, this is not the type of behavior that should be encouraged. My
firm filed a class action suit. The people who participated in that suit
shared a substantial settlement. The plaintiff class members received
substantial awards, including one individual who received $225,000, and
they were very, very grateful. Hundreds of them wrote unsolicited letters
of thanks to us telling our firm that the lawsuit helped them pay medical
bills and other necessary expenses that they never would have been able
to pay but for this class action.
So if mass tort class actions are eliminated, we will not only wipe out
some cases without merit, but also cases that have merit. That is why I
urge extreme caution when considering changes in the procedural rules in
this area. One must give judges the flexibility to have class actions in
mass tort areas when it is appropriate.
In summary, if Americans are to have faith in the judicial system,
they need to believe that they have access to the courthouse. The way to
do that is to keep the class action in place.

THE AGENCY PROBLEM:
SOME PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS
JANET COOPER ALEXANDER, FOURTH PANELIST"

A few years ago, I wrote an article about settlements in securities
class actions entitled, "Do the Merits Matter?"' Ever since then I have
wanted to write the sequel, "Making the Merits Matter." That is what I
would like to talk about today-procedural reforms for securities and
consumer class actions.
In doing law reform, it is important to take a structural and
institutional approach, looking at what is actually happening in a particular
type of litigation we are focusing on. We must try to figure out what it
is that is causing the conduct of that litigation to deviate from what we
think of as the normal or ideal way that such litigation should be resolved.
Then we should fix that, rather than taking the view that the problem is
too much litigation or frivolous litigation or greedy lawyers. I do not
think that attitude leads to helpful solutions.
I want to talk about a type of reform that addresses what may be the
core issue in representative litigation, and that is the agency problem.
When litigation is brought by a representative on behalf of people who are
not before the court, the issue is whether the lawyers' interests and the
representatives' interests may diverge from those of the class. In
securities cases, there is some evidence that cases settle without regard to
the strength of the case on the merits. In addition, some of the other
speakers have referred to settlements in consumer class actions that appear
to provide negligible benefits to the consumer class members, but
substantial fees to the lawyers.
I think there are two basic kinds of solutions to the agency problem.
One is to have a client present to monitor the lawyers' performance. The
other is to take steps to align the lawyers' interests more perfectly with the
class's interest. In terms of having a client present, I think there is

actually a possibility of doing that more effectively in securities class
actions because they do not fit the paradigm of class actions. In that
paradigm, class actions are needed because there are many small claims
that individually are not worth bringing suit over. The problem is that
although class actions empower people to bring such claims, there is
nobody with a stake big enough to justify monitoring the lawyers'
performance.
* Professor of Law and Justin M. Roack, Jr., Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law
School.
1. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. RaV. 497 (1991).
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In securities class actions, however, there are claimants who have a
lot at stake. In fact, one study showed that the top ten claimants account
for about thirty-five percent of the total claims.' Thus, some class
members, who for the most part are institutional investors, have sizable
claims in this setting.
Institutional investors have received significant attention from
academics and legislators recently. If you are interested in solving the
agency problem, institutional investors appear to be the answer to your
dreams, because they are big enough to perform an effective job of
monitoring and their interests seem to be almost perfectly aligned with the
public interest in the securities laws. They consume large amounts of
information about companies, and thus have a strong interest in
maintaining a disclosure environment that is not tainted by securities
fraud. On the other hand, they are investors and make their money from
their investments, so they have a strong interest in making sure that
companies are not paying high costs for suits that have no merit. The lead
plaintiff provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
represent an effort to get large investors involved. 3
I would propose, and this is the most radical thing I would propose
today, to have an "opt-in" requirement for securities class actions that
would affect the largest investors. The opt-in threshold would be set so
as to cover approximately the top ten or twenty claimants in the class.
Those investors would have to opt-in if they wanted to participate in the
recovery. If they opt-in, they thereby signify their willingness to serve on
a plaintiffs' steering committee that would monitor the conduct of the
litigation, including the choice of the class counsel.
The opt-in requirement would identify potential members of a
plaintiffs' steering committee to monitor the litigation and perform the
traditional role of the client. Additionally, it would make the amount of
potential damages more certain and more verifiable, because the large
claimants would be required to specify the relevant information concerning
their trades. Only the small claims would have to be estimated. If large
claims opted out, they would be excluded from the damage calculation.
This would reduce the uncertainty in damages, and the disparity between
the parties' estimates, and would make the calculation of damages more
realistic.
2. See Vincent E. O'Brian & Richard W. Hodges, A Study of Class Action
Securities Fraud Cases 11-3 (June 1991) (unpublished study, on file with New York Law
School Law Review) (reporting that the top five claimants accounted for an average of

25% of the claims filed, and the top ten claimants accounted for 34.49% of the claims
filed).

3. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B), 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
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The second type of reform that I would propose is a "truth in labeling
requirement" in consumer and securities cases. The amount of a
settlement or judgment would only be permitted to be stated in per-claim
or per-unit terms (in securities cases, an amount per share), not as an
aggregate lump sum.
The primary reason for this is that when the class members get the
notice of settlement and have to decide whether to object to the settlement,
to opt-out, to file a claim or to do nothing, the most important information
they need to know is how much they are going to get out of the
settlement. That is information that the class members in securities cases
do not have. All they know is the total amount to be distributed to the
class. Usually, they get some idea of what the attorneys' fees might be,
but often they have no information about how many shares there are in the
class or how many shares will claim. Moreover, if this information were
made available before the fairness hearing, it would help the judge
evaluate the fairness of the settlement.
In addition, this proposal would help promote settlement (at least
initially). Typically the plaintiffs say there are many shares in the class
and the defendants deny this and say there are very few. If the parties
really believed their numbers, and if settlement offers had to be stated in
per-share terms, there would be a greatly expanded zone of agreement.
The parties could say, "Let's settle for two dollars a share," which would
seem like a small amount to the defendants and a large amount to the
plaintiffs. Now obviously, at the end of the day somebody is going to be
surprised, but over time people ought to learn to estimate more accurately.
Finally, I propose reforms that would better align the interests of the
plaintiffs, the lawyers, and the class. These reforms relate to fee awards.
I propose that there be no negotiation or discussion of the fee award until
after the final approval of the settlement. Further, rather than having one
lump sum settlement amount from which the attorney fees are deducted,
there should first be an agreement or a judgment on the amount that will
go to the class. After final approval of the settlement, there should be an
adjudication of the amount of the attorneys' fees, which would be paid
directly by the defendant.
What these two reforms would accomplish is to ensure that the
defendant has an interest in presenting an adversary presentation on the fee
issue. Currently, there is an acute conflict of interest between the class
and the lawyers on the fee request, because every dollar that goes to the
lawyers comes directly from the class recovery. Yet that is the very point
where there is no longer an adversary presentation. There are some
quixotic folks who go around filing objections, but I think it is unwise to
rely on Larry Shoenbrun to do everything.
Next, I would tie the amount of the fee more directly to the benefit
conferred on the class by holding the hearing on the fee award only after
the close of the period for filing claims. If the recovery is stated on a per-
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share basis, then once all the claims are filed you know exactly what the
benefit is that has been conferred on the class, and the fee can be
determined in that light. In determining a reasonable fee, the judge should
be required to make an explicit reference to the proportionality of the fee
to the benefit conferred on the class.
This reform would not add much to current securities settlements,
where the total amount of the class recovery is known, at least in all-cash
settlements without give-back provisions.4 It would have real bite,
however, in consumer class actions where non-cash-"coupon" or "inkind"-settlements are common and frequently criticized.' Examples
come readily to mind: the Cuisinart food processor price-fixing settlement,
where purchasers received half-off coupons for future purchases of nonfood-processor Cuisinart products; 6 the airline coupon price-fixing
settlement, where class members got coupons with a face value of $408
million toward future purchases and $50 million in cash, and class counsel
received $14 million cash;7 the proposed GM pick-up truck product
liability settlement, which would have given class members a coupon good
for $1000 off on the purchase of another GM truck, plus $9.5 million in
attorneys' fees;8 and the proposed settlement of the Ford Bronco II
litigation, which would have given class members a free inspection, an
educational video, an owner's manual supplement, a safety sticker for
their sun visors (much of which was already required by government
regulation), and $6 million in fees. 9
4. A "give-back" provision directs that unclaimed funds revert to the defendant.

5. See Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REv. 810 (1996).
6. See In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., MDL 447, 1983 WL 153,
*2-3 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 1983).
7. See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga.
1993).
8. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing the settlement approved by the district court, in part
on the issue of the adequacy of the settlement), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
9. See In re Ford Motor Co., Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., CIV.A.MDL 991, 1997
WL 104971, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 1997) (finding that there was no consideration
because consumers only received information to which they were already entitled, and
that fee request was "so far out of the range of what I consider reasonable as to suggest
... collusion"); see also Emily Barker, Class Members Claim Duplicity in Photocopier
Suit, AM. LAW., May 1994, at 29 (discussing proposed settlement of antitrust suit against
Xerox by customers and copier repair companies; the proposed settlement consisted of
discount coupons to end-users with a face value of $223 million, $2 million in coupons
to 4000 copier repair class members, $5 million cash to five named plaintiffs, and a clear
sailing clause for $35 million in fees).
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Such nonpecuniary settlements have been criticized for delivering little
if any benefit to the class, while generating large attorneys' fees.' One
problem for courts in evaluating such settlements is the difficulty in
valuing the non-cash component. By deferring the attorney fee award
until the class has actually filed claims, my proposal would take much of
the uncertainty out of this endeavor. Similarly, it would eliminate
uncertainty as to how many members of the class would actually file
claims."
These reforms would be superior to many of the reforms that have
been proposed legislatively, and except for the opt-in requirement, these
reforms could be adopted by judges without congressional action.

10. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:
Balancing Fairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CI. L. RFv. 877
(1987); Note, supra note 5.
11. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities ClassActions,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1448-49 (1994).

TOBACCO LITIGATION*
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MOORE, FIFTH PANELIST*

Good morning, everyone. That is how we do things down in
Mississippi. I do not know if I am in a hospitality state today or not after
hearing Sheila Birnbaum and Max Boot and having read many of the
wonderful things that Mr. Boot has written about some of my friends,
such as Dick Scruggs and others in this room, and hearing him use the
terms "tool of the devil" and then the term "legalized blackmail"-I know
that I am not involved in any of that.
My presentation is much different than any of the things that are being
talked about today. I am going to give an update about the tobacco
litigation, where we came from, where we are now, and where we hope
to go.
Tobacco litigation is a much different situation than any class action
lawsuit. As attorney general of Mississippi, I have various duties, and
one of those duties that is paramount to me is to protect the public health
and the public interest.
The backdrop of the following case is the tremendous burden on the
health care budget of this country caused by one industry-the tobacco
industry. The estimates are that anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five
percent of the total health care costs in this country are attributable to
tobacco-related disease.' It is likely that everyone in this room today has
a loved one somewhere in the family that has contracted or died from lung
cancer, heart disease, or emphysema. And, probably, each of you in this
room knows of a child or some other who has died from either sudden
infant death syndrome or some of the many other cancers, we say, are
caused by tobacco-related disease. It is a personal issue with many people
in this country, but it is a professional and a public responsibility issue
with the attorneys general of this country.
We did not just start working on this when, in the last couple of
years, it became the popular thing to do. Mississippi began working on
our case back in early 1993. No one in my state told me it was an
advisable course of action-to go against the tobacco industry. As a
*

0

Copyright by The Honorable Michael Moore 1997.

** Attorney general of the State of Mississippi. Attorney General Moore is also
Chairman of the National Association of Attorneys General Criminal Law Committee and
is the Chairman of the National Alliance.
1. See generally Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,575
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897) (discussing the
incidence of higher reported lifetime medical costs for smokers than non-smokers).
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matter of fact, I remember the day we sued the tobacco industry. When
asked what he thought about my lawsuit my governor stated, "It makes me
want to throw up." At least I had support from my governor.
One of the things that an attorney general does is go to the legislature
to get appropriations. So two or three weeks after the initiation of the
suit, I went across the street to ask Chairman Capps, who is the head of
the Appropriations Committee, for money to run my office. Now,
Chairman Capps is a big smoker and plays in all of the RJR golf
tournaments. Well, he had a long cigar at the end of the table, and, of
course, he said, "Mr. Attorney General, I do not want you to spend one
penny on that damned tobacco lawsuit."
I said, "Well, what if we recover a bunch of money?"
"I don't want to hear anything about it," he replied. So again, I had
tremendous support.
The most horrible call I received was from one of my law school
buddies, who called me from New Orleans. He is one of those awful
plaintiffs' lawyers who makes all this money and leaves other people
without anything. He knew that I had been a prosecutor and that I had
been involved in prosecuting the drug cartels and organizations like that
for ten or twelve years. He said to me, "Hey, Moore, you ain't suing the
cocaine boys; these are the tobacco companies."
So I felt good,
steady, and ready to go. The last two-and-a-half years have been that kind
of ride.
I am sure I have many supporters in this group. I recognize many of
you from the law firms, and you really should say "thank you," because
I know how much money I have made for you over the last two-and-a-half
years. My friend, Dick Scruggs, remarked to me earlier that you have all
probably taken out key man insurance plans on me, because if I die, many
of you are going to go out of business.
In my estimation, the tobacco case is the most important public health
litigation ever filed. The backdrop is that 420,000 people die from
tobacco-related disease each year;2 it is the number one preventable cause
of death in this country. Furthermore, three thousand children start
smoking every day, and one in three of those kids will die from tobaccorelated disease. 3 So from that standpoint, I cannot think of a more
important role for attorneys general or even lawyers to play than in trying
to protect the public health. Yet one can argue, as the tobacco companies
do-and I still cannot believe I have seen this in some of the transcripts
from these smokers cases-that cigarettes do not cause cancer, and that
nicotine is not an addictive drug. They also claim they do not manipulate
2. See id. at 44,398.

3. See id. at 44,399.
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the levels of nicotine. Remember the testimony before Congress in
1994?4
The defense theories presented in these cases are perplexing: the
tobacco industry says that smokers assume the risk. They do not cause
the injury but smokers assume the risk. That is the strangest thing I have
ever seen in the law.
With that backdrop, what we began to look at in Mississippi, and
frankly in the whole country, is the tremendous cost to the public health
of treating tobacco-related illness. In our particular case, we primarily
focused on indigent people. In Mississippi-I know it is a small southern
state with a population of only two-and-a-half million people-about
twenty to twenty-five percent of the people are on Medicaid, which
constitutes 500,000 to 550,000 people as of this year. We also have the
highest instance of heart disease. We spend, in little Mississippi, about
$100 million a year just to treat poor people for tobacco-related disease.
We cannot afford that in Mississippi. When that number is multiplied
across the country, it amounts to between six and eight billion dollars a
year that states and the federal government spend just treating poor
people.
Not only did we want to recover these costs for the taxpayers, we also
wanted to stop the tobacco companies from marketing, advertising, and
selling their products to children. The enforcement provisions to prevent
the sale of tobacco to minors in all states have not worked.
One of the things we have accomplished, and will continue to
accomplish in these cases, is to expose the truth about the industry. There
are sixteen states now that have filed cases against the tobacco industry.5
We filed our first case in May of 1994. Shortly after that, four other
states filed.
Within those sixteen states, there are different causes of action. Most
of them have equitable causes of action that involve unjust enrichment,
restitution, indemnity, public nuisance, and requests for injunctive relief.
Other states filed and added consumer protection or antitrust planks, and
traditional tort theories. Others filed in federal court. Texas filed a
4. On June 21, 1994, FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler stated that regulation

may be necessary if it proves true that tobacco companies manipulated levels of nicotine
to get more smokers addicted. The tobacco companies vehemently denied this allegation.
See Keith Glover, LatestFDA Tobacco Testimony SuggestsRegulation Is Near,52 CONG.
Q. WKLY. RP. 1722 (1994).
5. As of May 1997, 29 states had filed suit against the tobacco industry. See John
Schwartz, In Tobacco Suits, States Find Strength in Numbers: Mississippi Attorney
GeneralRallies Coalition of Colleagues in Landmark Legal Battle, WASH. POST, May
18, 1997, at A6.
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federal racketeering action against the tobacco industry. 6 So, primarily,
fifteen state cases and one federal case have been filed.
There have been significant events in these cases. In my own case,
for example, not only am I facing the tobacco industry on one side, but
I have been sued by both the governor of my state-yes, sued by the
governor of my own state in an attempt to stop our case-and the tobacco
companies, to stop our lawsuit. We argued the case last week before the
Supreme Court of Mississippi. 7
Whistle blowers have also been present. Frankly, I have never seen
such a dodge to hide the truth in my life as from this litigation. I have
also never seen such a misuse of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product privileges as in these cases. This was revealed by the documents,
whether borrowed or stolen, of Brown & Williamson.
It is hard to find a tobacco case where any of those documents have
been turned over in discovery, even though they have been made public
over the past two years. When Dick Scruggs and I got those documents,
we took them to the Justice Department, the Food and Drug
Administration, and Congress, and now they are even on the Internet. I
point that out because I have heard so much criticism about lawyers and
what they do. I think some of the shining examples of this litigation are
what lawyers are doing in the search for truth.
There is one thing that is always challenged in these cases: the
contingency, the contracts. We do not have a contingency fee contract in
Mississippi; our lawyers will only get paid, in our particular case, should
we win our case. The court will be asked to award reasonable attorneys'
fees at that point. All other states do have contingency fee contracts that
range anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five percent.
Ours is the first case that will be tried. The trial is set for March 23,
1997.8 The judge has declined to stay the action, even though the
tobacco companies have attempted time and time again to have the action
stayed. We think our case will be tried that day. Discovery is going very
well from our side and we have turned over millions of documents to the
tobacco companies. However, it is very slow from the other side.
6. See Barnaby J. Feder, Texas Joins Other States in Suing Tobacco Industry, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1996, at B5 (stating that Texas became the seventh state to sue the
tobacco industry).
7. See Suein L. Hwang, Wigand Testifies in Mississippi Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.,

Nov. 30, 1995, at B10.
8. On March 13, 1997, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that Attorney General

Moore's suit seeking to recoup the state's health care costs can go to trial. See
Mississippi High Court Rejects Move to Block Tobacco Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
1997, at A3.
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Of the other cases set for trial, the next case will probably be the
Florida case. 9 As you know, Florida not only has a very solid case, but
also a statute that was passed through the legislature, which has been the
center of some controversy and lots of litigation.'° I predict the next
case to be tried after the Florida case will be the Texas case." So in
1997, I think we will see the Mississippi case, the Florida case, and the
Texas case-each a different type of case-being tried. And the next case
that will be tried, perhaps in late 1998, will be the Minnesota case.' 2
The one settlement that we did have, the Liggett settlement, was the3
first time any tobacco company has ever paid any money in any case.
It looks like the settlement will be worth about twenty-five million dollars.
And the lawyers did not make any money out of those settlements. There
have been no fees paid, and there will be no fees paid out of that
settlement. My lawyers are working pro bono.

9. See Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed
Feb. 21, 1995) (asserting racketeering charges against the tobacco industry in a Medicaid

reimbursement action).
10. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West Supp. 1997); see also Agency for Health
Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996) (upholding
section 409.910, the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act).

11. See Texas v. American Tobacco Co., No. 596CV91 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 28,
1996).

12. See Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Statutes Aiding States' Recovery of Medicaid Costs
from Tobacco Companies:A Better Strategyfor Redressing Identifiable Harm?, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 445 (1995) (noting that the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue

Shield brought suit against the tobacco industry in Minnesota v. PhilipMorris, Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (D. Minn. filed Aug. 17, 1994)).
13. Until March 1996, the tobacco industry vowed not to settle and to defeat every
lawsuit brought against it. Liggett was the first company to break ranks and settle with
anti-tobacco lawyers. See Richard Tomkins, First Chink in Tobacco Manufacturers'
Armour: Maker of Chesterfield Cigarettes Breaks Ranks and Offers a Deal to AntiTobacco Lawyers, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1996, at 4.

PANEL ONE:
PANELIST RESPONSES
MAX BOOT: I would imagine that the panelists are just itching and
dying to jump in and respond to what they have heard.
SHEILA BIRNBAUM: I would just like to respond to my friend on
the plaintiff's side. I get very disturbed when six people sitting in
Cheyenne, Wyoming, or in any other place in the country, are going to
decide whether a corporation's existence continues or does not continue.
It is not the American people that are deciding class actions if they go to
a jury, but six people, sitting in a local courthouse, that are deciding the
fate of an entire corporation or, in some cases, an entire industry. That
is a very different kind of thing. That is why corporations are afraid to
put their whole corporate existence on the line.
With class actions, up to one million people might be riding the
coattails of the representative plaintiffs, and six people in some local
community will be making the decision. That is very scary.
Also, with regard to the cases that were mentioned and the issue of
applying the law of fifty jurisdictions, I know what happened in the
Copley case' in Cheyenne, Wyoming; it never went to the jury where
there could have been a charge. What was to go to the jury was the law
of three different jurisdictions, because the representative plaintiffs came
from three jurisdictions. 2 So the jury would have been charged with
separate law on negligence, strict liability, punitive damages, and
causation. On top of that, the court thought it was merely going to charge
the Restatement of Torts 402A3 and a plain negligence charge. As a
result, all people in states that had similar law would be bound. Judge
Brimmer even noted in his fairness hearing that there was a lot of
controversy regarding whether the charge would be upheld on appeal.
The Cordis case4 was inferentially overruled by the Sixth Circuit in
American Medical,5 which held that the 304 district court cases that had
been certified, including In re Dow Coming Corp.,6 Dante,7 and
1. In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).

2. See id. at 465.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1964).

4. In re Cordis Pacemaker Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 850, C-3-86-543, 1992 WL
754061 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 1992).

5. In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
6. 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996).
7. Dante v. Dow Coming Corp., 143 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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Cordis, 8 were not proper class actions. 9 So I still believe we cannot have
a trial class, a national class, in tort cases.
THE HONORABLE PATRICK HIGGINBOTHAM: I think this
discussion highlights a point that bears mentioning again: the problems we
are talking about are largely confined to one segment of class actions.
Interestingly, I hear counsel start to talk about mass torts and then very
quickly shift to discrimination cases as the model of success.
What we found in the course of our study in the rules process is that
class actions have been working reasonably well. There are some serious
problems, but, by and large, the legal culture that surrounds securities
class actions is working reasonably well. The discrimination model has
worked reasonably well. We find no mass tort cases, in fact, that actually
have been tried. It does not happen. There may be some out there, but
we have not located them, as we defined them. Thus, the problem
becomes not about the trial of mass tort cases but about the settlements of
these large cases.
It also bears mentioning that it simply defies reality to deny the
powerful effects of aggregation. When I was a little lad, we used to
buy-against my mother's counsel-firecrackers. Back then they were
called by the politically incorrect name "ladyfingers." They were little,
tiny firecrackers about so big, and you could hold them in your nails to
light the fuse and they would pop. I quickly discovered with my cousins
that we could take about thirty or forty of those ladyfingers and put rubber
bands around them, and they would blow your hand off.
As for the aggregating effect, the class is proper if within the Rule,
even though it may bring with it an interim extortionate effect. On the
other hand, what you do not want to bring forward are cases that gain
their strength not from the merit of the claim, but from the aggregation
itself. That is one of the problems that the Rules Committee has been
trying to get at-to separate out those cases. For some time, we looked
very seriously at insisting upon an inquiry into the merits of the class
claims as an element of the class certification. We played with
formulations such as insisting that there be some demonstration of the
likelihood of success-something akin to the injunction model.
We looked seriously at that formulation over a long period, and there
was initially a lot of support for it across the board. But as time went by,
we began to realize that the price for it would be too large, and I won't
take the time to go into that, except simply to remind people, as we talk
8. 1992 WL754061.
9. American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1074.
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about this problem, that it is very useful to talk about mass tort as the
problem and not something else. There is an internal dynamic in the
economics of the mass tort that does not exist elsewhere.
Class actions are not the creatures, necessarily, of lawyers. There is
something else going on there, and part of it has to do with economy of
scale. Once a lawyer gains the information, resources, and all the mass
discovery needed to maintain a single suit, then he or she can deal with
cases on a marginal cost basis; he or she can virtually franchise out to
other lawyers. Hence, the economics of the structure itself stem from the
patterned nature of the phenomenon we are talking about-a common
product, a common disaster. That is what drives these cases, and that is
one of the powerful contributions to aggregation-the economics itself.
On a related note, our legal structure has, in the name of efficiency,
pooled these cases together through the class action process, and we have
been very quick to pull cases from their moorings and send them to be
consolidated before a single judge. That may sometimes be counterproductive.
My last observation is to be very wary of extrapolating from the
asbestos phenomenon. Asbestos appears in the background of many of the
mass tort cases, but very few of them are asbestos cases. Asbestos
evolved to the point where the science was very clear; the cases became
essentially, as Francis McGovern would call them, commodities-the
commoditization of torts. Very experienced lawyers in asbestos cases can
price those cases incredibly accurately and reach quick agreements on
valuations. It is a different ballgame than breast implants.
I mediated the Ahern settlement,' 0 and I was involved in the
mediation of the breast implant cases. They are very different. In those
breast implant cases, there was no developed science. We are dealing
with very different sets of problems, and my observation is simply one of
definition: trying to locate where the problems are, so that we can begin
to talk constructively, not necessarily about solutions but at least about
helpful approaches.
MR. BOOT: I think that's an excellent point. I will now ask the
panelists to address a basic premise that Judge Higginbotham and the
others were discussing, which is that the problems are really in the mass
tort cases. The underlying assumption is that these are basically
meritorious cases, but the problem is adjusting the figures so the plaintiffs'
lawyers do not get ninety-nine percent of the benefits but only get sixty or
seventy percent of the benefits.
10. See In re Asbestosis Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied,
101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, No. 96-1394 (Mar. 3, 1997).
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Let me also ask the panel about the basic assumption that these cases
involve problems that ought to be dealt with by the legal system and not
by regulatory agencies. For example, John Cracken, an up and coming
young plaintiffs' lawyer in Texas, sued Allstate and Farmers Insurance,
charging that the companies have been incorrectly calculating their
premiums for years through an obscure process known as "double
rounding."" I will save you the tedious details of what double rounding
involves, but, basically, it is theoretically a small error that costs each
driver no more than $3.50 per year. But, obviously, once you add up
$3.50 over ten years, you get a $100 million lawsuit from which
Mr. Cracken hopes to receive $30 or $40 million.
Now, assuming that he is successful, and he probably will be because
it has been certified as a class,' 2 what will the insurance companies have
to do if they have to pay out up to $100 million? They will, of course,
raise their premiums to make up for that loss. So it is hard to see how the
drivers will be better off one way or the other. They will be worse off
under the suit.
My real point is that this is a case involving an industry that is
regulated rather strictly by the Texas Department of Insurance, just as
securities offerings are regulated strictly by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). So my question is, does it make any sense at all for
the legal process to be attempting to rectify these $3.50 wrongs?
JAMES M. FINBERG: It absolutely does. The SEC does not have
the time or resources to go after all the potential or actual securities fraud.
And the legislative history of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995,11 a rather conservative bill from a Republican Congress, talks14
about the importance of private enforcement of the securities laws.
Private enforcement of the securities laws is absolutely essential.
11. See Dollar-Roundingat Issue, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1996, at A8 (stating that six
named plaintiffs represented by John Cracken filed suit against Texas Farmers and

Allstate insurance companies for an estimated $109 million in damages, stemming from
the companies' practice over the last ten years of over-charging customers by millions
of dollars).

12. See id.
13. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference stated:
Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded
investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon government
action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our
capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and guarantee that corporate
officers, auditors, directors, lawyers, and others properly perform their jobs.

141 CONG. Rc. H13691-08, H13699 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
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Let me address Professor Alexander's point about the securities area.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 adopted many of her
suggestions to some extent. For example, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act says that there is a presumption that the investor or group of
persons with the largest financial interest will be the class representative
and that individual or group of persons will pick his or her counsel. 5
Now, there are a few problems with that. There have been about one
hundred suits filed since the Reform Act was passed. Institutional
investors stepped forward in only two cases. The reasons are two-fold:
first, the institutional investors are not interested in being involved in
discovery; and, second, the loss-although large in absolute terms-is a
relatively small percentage of their overall portfolio. For an individual
investor, in contrast, the loss may be a high percentage of his or her life
savings, and thus it means a great deal more. For example, I have a case
where a Marin school teacher lost $40,000. That might not be as much
as Fidelity Magellan lost, but it was almost eighty percent of her life
savings. To her, it is much more important; it is a much bigger deal in
her life than it is to the institutional investors.
I should tell you that I represent the Colorado Public Employee
Retirement Association (ColPERA) and the California State Teachers
Retirement System (CaISTRS) in In re CaliforniaMicro Devices Securities
Litigation 6 as local counsel. I think it is a good thing when institutions
get involved, but it is not going to happen very often.
The truth in labeling requirement is also part of the new law. It says
that settlement notices now must give disclosure on a per-share basis. 7
The problem at the outset is that it is unknown generally how many people
are going to submit claims. What is known is that plaintiffs take the
amount of money that is available to distribute. One has to divide that
number by the number of claims submitted. Therefore the per-share
award would not be known until the end. So there must be an estimate,
which is what I think is going to happen in the settlement notices. But,
again, that is a good thing.
With respect to attorneys' fees, attorneys in securities cases generally
apply for a percentage of the common fund created for the benefit of the
plaintiff class. The benchmark of the Ninth Circuit is twenty-five percent,
which means that the class gets seventy-five percent of the money and the
attorneys get only twenty-five percent.'
15.
16.
17.
18.

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (West Supp. 1997).
No. C-94-2817-VRW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1995).
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4.
See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1989).
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As to the issue of choice of law, I think it is cleaner to sue the
defendant in the defendant's home state and to apply the law of the home
state. We will see more of that in the future. As to mass tort cases, I
think the answer is to give discretion to the district court judges. To some
extent, it is like the pornography cases: They will know meritorious cases
when they see them.
And, if summary judgment is allowed to come before class
certification, the truly meritless cases are going to be dismissed on
summary judgment before the class certification determination. But, if it
is a strong case, and it can survive that kind of attack, it should continue.
One does not want to have a case such as the Cordis case"9-where the
corporate officers pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal charge of
knowingly selling a defective product-not to be certified. Such a result
would deny access to the justice system in meritorious cases. In the
Cordis case, the victims were largely senior citizens who could not afford
to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on experts. That is what it
costs to pursue one of these complex mass tort cases. The class action
device gave these innocent persons, who were done wrong, access to the
justice system; it gave them a voice and redress.
A subset of the mass tort cases are the toxic spill cases. Maybe Your
Honor differentiates them. In these cases, one has to have a modeling
expert to figure out where the toxic air plume went or where the water
flow went. These are very expensive cases, and many people are
seriously harmed. My firm handled the Southern Pacific railroad spill
case2 in California, where a toxic pesticide was dumped into the
Sacramento River. No individual could have brought that case. Only
through collective action could those meritorious claims have been
resolved.
JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM: There is one question that I think should
be strongly emphasized: Who decides whether or not this particular social
policy reflected by this statute should be enforced by these means?
The assumption that people will go uncompensated, that people who
have been wronged will not be protected, rests upon the assumption that
the protection of the statute, as written, has accorded that type of
protection to them. One of the problems with Rule 23 is its potential for
shifting the decision-making responsibility for enforcement of these social
policies from the Congress to the courts-that is, to the lawyers.
19. In re Cordis Pacemaker Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 850, C-3-86-543, 1992

WL 754061 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 1992).
20. In re Sacramento River Spill Cases I & II, Jud. Council Coord. Proc. Nos. 2617
& 2620 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 20, 1993).
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In those situations where Congress has said that this is the policy and
this is the way it is to be enforced, it is very difficult to deny the
legitimacy of this type of aggregation. But, in the situations where they
have not made that statement, reluctance to imply private rights of
enforcement ought to take over.
So I think beneath the surface of this question of consumer rights lies
the familiar question of who decides the allocation of power. Eddie
Becker made a vital point in the General Motors case?' in pointing to the
underlying federalism concerns of an overly generous reading of Rule 23
which can move these cases from state courts into federal courts. It is
easy to say that we will dispense with the nuanced differences among the
state laws, but, remember, those nuanced differences are reflections of
state policies. Whether Texas elects to go one way and Wyoming another
reflects considered judgments of those states, and the price you pay for
this efficiency is to step on those differences.
Now, that may be permissible if the national interest and the
Commerce Clause is so consciously invoked that we decide to step on
these state interests. In other words, if it is a federal problem, it ought
to be approached that way. But then the question is, who decides that?
And I think these lurking questions must ultimately go back to Congress.
In fairness to Attorney General Moore, if we say that we cannot
proceed through the private class action device, if we are saying in part
that it lacks legitimacy, what we are saying is that the elected officials,
who have legitimacy, ought to be willing to enforce them.
I express no opinion about the tobacco litigation; but, certainly,
attorneys general, who have the statutory enforcement power, have a
much higher claim to legitimacy in enforcing those rights, one would say,
on its face, then perhaps volunteers. At least the argument is made: Can
you have your cake and eat it too? Can one say simultaneously that we
cannot maintain these class actions, neither can the lawyers in private
enforcement, nor can states, nor can the federal government, nor can any
other agency?
Well, those are difficult social questions, and my comments do not
concern their merits. I want to pull them up, so that we realize that what
initially comes to us dressed as light, little procedural issues can quickly
reach very deep social judgments. I think that is part of the perplexity
that confounds many of us who struggle with these problems.

21. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
790-91 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
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AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
QUESTION: I am from Public Citizen.
a balanced moderator who does not have an
that Max Boot is now going to support all
regulatory agencies as an alternative to tort

I am glad that you guys have
opinion, and I am glad to see
our efforts to strengthen the
litigation.

MAX BOOT: That is a different panel discussion.
QUESTION: We are not used to having any time to talk to you, Mr.
Boot, so I figured I would get that in.
I am curious if any of the panel would like to talk about Public
Citizen's work on breaking up collusive class actions. We have now
intervened in over a dozen cases to go after plaintiffs' attorneys' fees,
because we are concerned that the remedy for consumers is not large
enough and that the corporations are using a select group of plaintiffs'
attorneys to create settlements where the consumer's benefit is small and
the attorney's fee is large.
We are more involved than any other group, and yet we continue to
get attacked as being "in the pocket" of the Trial Bar. I am curious if any
of you would like to talk about this trend. In fact, Judge Higginbotham
mentioned Fred Baron, who has been working with us and is one of the
stalwarts working to clean up this process so that we can make sure the
class action device survives and is not abused.
I think the consumer movement gets very little credit for intervening
in these cases and going after both the corporations and the Trial Bar.
JAMES M. FINBERG: Attorneys' fees in class actions have to be
approved by the court; there has to be notice to the class members; and
the class members have to be given an opportunity to object. A judge
should take that seriously. It is completely inappropriate for attorneys'
fees to get higher than the amounts that are given to the class. I
absolutely agree with that.
Consumer groups are to be applauded for taking an interest in
attorneys' fees. There should always be vigilance about attorneys' fees.
I can say that in every case we have had, the class members have always
gotten more than the attorneys, and that is the way it should be.
QUESTION: Mr. Moore, I am really pleased that you are here today
because I am not a professional litigation attorney. I read about the
tobacco lawsuits as an interested shareholder of Philip Morris, and I get
most of my information from the Wall Street Journal, so as you know, the
information is pretty one-sided.
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The issue that interests me is not about fundamental human liberty and
the ability of an adult to make a choice and to assume a risk, or whether
we are going to have a free society. I am interested in the economic point
of view. Everything I read about those lawsuits indicates that there is no
economic cost to the government from tobacco-related deaths because
smokers tend to die in their sixties, just at the point when they are about
to go onto Social Security. I wonder if that is a net savings. I have never
seen a response as to that; I only see one side of the analysis.
Even if you say that it does cost Mississippi something in the form of
Medicaid payments, I would like to know if you have actually looked at
whether there is a savings to Mississippi-just looking at the economic
point of view. Is there any way to look at this where it would make a
difference to you?
Suppose the federal government picked up all of the Medicaid costs.
Is there any way that economic analysis would have an impact on you that
would make you stop that litigation?
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MOORE: Sure, and I thank you very
much for that question. Of the defenses that the tobacco companies have
espoused, the "early death" defense is the one that I love the most. The
last time that I remember a tobacco company brought that argument before
the court, they said, "Okay, Judge, just assume for a minute that we do
kill these people. Just assume that we do. We're not saying we do,
because cigarettes do not cause cancer, nicotine is not an addictive drug,
and we do not sell to children. But just assume that they prove that we
do, that they die early in Mississippi. Think about how much money we
save the taxpayers of the State of Mississippi, and the federal government,
because grandma and grandpa die early. We do not pay Social Security
anymore; we do not pay Medicaid and Medicare anymore; we do not pay
retirement benefits; and these people do not earn any more. And, also,
just think about the money that those doctors make and the taxes that they
pay from treating all these poor people. We are economic development
in your state."
During the first three hearings, this was the only time that our judge
ever said a word or ever looked up. Of course, we were scratching our
It is a wonderful jury
heads; we were loving this argument.
argument-just wonderful. But, you can talk to Peter Huber later, a
panelist who is the king of the doctor death defense.
What we get in the State of Mississippi, and all of the other states, are
taxes that are paid by whom? The tobacco companies want to make
people believe, and they even try to make our judge believe, that the
tobacco companies paid those taxes. Tobacco companies do not pay those
taxes. Smokers pay the fifty million dollars in excise taxes, yet tobacco
companies also want an offset for the money they "save" us because they
kill our people early. No other area of law gives credit for the damage,
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or for the offset, one achieves. Imagine if we were going to fine someone
in court ten thousand dollars for destroying a building? The analogous
argument would be: "Wait a minute, Judge. I added it up, and over the
last twenty years, I've paid $250,000 in taxes, so you owe me money."
It is a ridiculous argument, and it is the kind of argument that only the
tobacco companies would make.
SHEILA BIRNBAUM: Can I respond? Although it is ridiculous as
a jury argument because of its political incorrectness, as an economic
argument it is not. It is a fact that tobacco companies pay more taxes.
Each cigarette pack in most states carries a large tax over and above the
normal taxes that people pay.
I would just like to say one other thing. I worry about the tobacco
litigation that the attorneys general have brought because I am concerned
about who is next. If you can do it to tobacco, you can do it to hundreds
of other people. For example, many people get heart disease from high
cholesterol food. Are we next going to attack the dairy farmers or the
people who manufacture all this high cholesterol food?
It is easy to pick on an industry that is politically incorrect at the
moment, but we may have let a genie out of a bottle who can, ultimately,
create havoc down the line. I think it is a very interesting problem.
MR. MOORE: It is interesting. My governor made the very same
argument. Obviously, we can have a disagreement today, but we
sincerely believe that the cigarette is the only product that causes damage
when used exactly as intended. We do not believe that pepperoni or milk,
which have health and nutritional benefit, have that effect. Please tell me
what health or nutritional benefit there is in a cigarette.
MS. BIRNBAUM:

I think there is a psychological benefit to

cigarettes. A cigarette can relax people who feel they are under stress.
MR. MOORE: So I guess it's a drug, then.
MS. BIRNBAUM: No.
MR. MOORE: It is not a drug. Is it a food?
MS. BIRNBAUM: It is a substance.
QUESTION: Attorney General Moore, how different is alcohol?
MR. MOORE: I have to tell you, I do not know if I agree with the
numbers on television. I watch doctors and read the reports about the
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"health benefits" of wine and other alcohol. However, I have seen no
documentation that shows any health benefit in the use of a cigarette.
Comparatively, the numbers are pretty large. Alcohol deaths in this
country range anywhere from 90,000 to 100,000 people a year from
alcohol-related disease-and, for comparison, cocaine and all the illegal
drugs kill about 20,000 people a year-versus 420,000 a year from
tobacco. I
So frankly, I do not think it applies to any other product because of
the product itself.
MR. FINBERG: I agree with Attorney General Moore that tobacco
is distinguishable. In addition to the points that he made, in a tobacco
case, you have evidence of manipulation of nicotine, evidence of
addiction, and intentional fraud. You simply do not get that with
pepperoni pizza or dairy products.
QUESTION: Judge Higginbotham, you touched briefly on settlement
class actions, but no one really talked much about it. I would be
interested in hearing your perspective, and a plaintiffs' lawyer's
perspective and maybe a professor's perspective, on whether the dangers
of collusion are greater where you are just certifying in order to settle and
whether fairness hearings are enough. Why is it that there is such a
controversy about these now?
THE HONORABLE PATRICK HIGGINBOTHAM: Yes, I think there
is a risk of collusion. The quick answer is that any time you have both
parties to the lawsuit in agreement, there is obviously an increased risk of
collusion. No one, I think, seriously contends that there is not that risk.
The question is, how do we respond to it appropriately?
Historically, our numbers show that approximately twenty-five percent
of all class action dispositions were actually settlement classes-meaning
that these cases were settled before a class was certified.
This is not a recent phenomenon. Its utilization in the mass tort area
itself has brought the settlement class front and center. I emphasize again
to look at the substantive area of the law you are talking about.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposal now simply
mandates a hearing. The question then is, are the courts adequately
addressing the possibility of collusion and of conflicts and adequacy of
representation? Well, can one locate cases of collusion in the federal
1. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Symptoms of Substance Dependance Associated with Use of Cigarettes, Alcohol, and
Illicit Drugs-UnitedStates, 1991-92, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 830

(1995).
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system that have not been smoked out and dealt with? Are the procedural
processes adequate? Sure there is a risk, but the critical question is,
where are those cases? The cases in which there is a higher risk are the
cases that are being litigated very forcefully by very able people, by public
interest groups, some of which are self-interested in the traditional
American way.
PROFESSOR JANET ALEXANDER: In my opinion, classes will be
certified for settlement because not all class actions can be tried. So it is
not a question of whether you have classes for settlement. I think the hard
question is whether you ought to be able to certify a class for settlement
purposes only, and that is a very troubling issue.
JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM: That is the phenomenon I am talking
about, and that is well over twenty-five percent of all class actions that we
have had. I did not particularize that answer to the question, but I was
talking about exactly that group of cases.
PROFESSOR ALEXANDER: But, the question is whether the class
gets appropriate value when there is no threat of litigation.
MR. FINBERG: The safeguard has to be the fairness hearing. The
fairness hearing has to be taken seriously. And to prevent the race to the
bottom-when lawyers think that they can get more than the plaintiffs'
proposed settlement-claimants have to feel free to go to the fairness
hearing and object to the settlement, and the court has to take those
objections seriously.
JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM: One quick point: The proposal says that
a settlement class can go forward, but it requires an opt-out right. What
that means from a claimant's perspective is that when they receive notice
of a class certification, they can get out of it.
Now, let us assume we are not going to allow any settlements before
certification. The class is required to be certified. They are locked in;
the case is settled. Unless there is some bargained-for opt-out right as
part of the settlement, the claimants do not have the right to dial out, only
a right to attack. So between cases that are settled before certification and
cases that are settled after, from the claimant's perspective, they are
certainly benefitting.
What is critical to understand about the Rules Committee's proposal
is that it insists upon notice, and it insists upon an opt-out right, and it
does not deal with futures. Once that is on the table and clear, I really do
not know if plaintiff lawyers or defendant lawyers have problems with it.
The discussion always drifts off into futures, inadequate notice, opt-out
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rights, et cetera, which are a different ballgame and a more difficult
subject.
QUESTION: Every couple of days, another large public contract is
granted to the contractors potentially worth billions of dollars. And, if
this had been about highway resurfacing or some other traditional state
government contract, we would immediately ask two questions: first, how
competitive was the bidding; and second, are they actually going to do the
work or are they going to be able to piggyback on the highway resurfacing
efforts of lawyers in other states?
Could any of the panelists, particularly Mr. Moore, comment on how
competitive this process has been, and how strong are the safeguards to
prevent billions of dollars from going to a lawyer who has piggy-backed?
MR. MOORE: I will say again, and it does not matter how hard and
how many times I say it, we do not have contingency fee contracts in
Mississippi. We did that for the sole purpose of keeping our eye on the
case, rather than on the lawyers of the debate. It is amazing to me that
the debate always switches.
In our complaint, we asked the court to award attorneys' fees in
whatever reasonable amount they determine, should we win our case. It
was not requested from the state, but from the tobacco companies.
Now, your question was about the other states. The attorneys general
from many states have requested proposals from law firms who were
interested in being involved in these cases. Some attorneys general have
received ten or fifteen and others five or six. Many of them organized
outside panels to make the selections.
The big determining factor is who is willing to front the cost for this
litigation. The guy who files today is better off. In Mississippi, we have
probably already spent three million dollars on our case, without any
compensation going back to the lawyers. In every state I know, the
contingency fee contract is a public record. It would be in my state if
there was one.
QUESTION: To follow up, it would be quite surprising if the
lawyers, at the successful termination of your case, asked for a fee based
on an hourly basis even though they had achieved an enormous settlement.
They will, in fact, be likely to ask for something related to the size of the
settlement. Therefore, you, in fact, have conferred on them a standing
that, in effect, gives them likely compensation based on the share of the
settlement.
MR. MOORE: Yes, if we win, we lawyers will probably make some
money. But it will be based, at least in our case, on the work that we do
and on the risks that we took.
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PROFESSOR ALEXANDER: I do not understand what the problem
is; here there is a client hiring a lawyer. Generally, I think the problem
arises in class actions when there is not a client there to supervise the
lawyer. If there is an active client, I do not see why it is a problem how
the defense lawyers get paid.

